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 1 
The politics of drug control in Nigeria: exclusion, repression and obstacles to policy 
change 
 
Gernot Klantschnig 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Background: International agencies have viewed West Africa as a major player in the global 
trade in cocaine and heroin and in efforts to control that trade, as there have been reports of 
escalating arrests of drug smugglers, large-VFDOH GUXJ VHL]XUHV DQG µQDUFR-VWDWHV¶ LQ WKH
subregion. It is claimed that a substantial share of the drugs available in Western markets 
transit through West Africa today and are increasingly used there as well. Notwithstanding 
this growing alarm, there is little serious scholarship addressing the issue of drugs and drug 
policy in West Africa. 
 
Methods: The article assesses and challenges some of the existing depictions of drugs and 
drug policy in West Africa through an empirical case study of drug control in Nigeria ± one 
RI :HVW $IULFD¶V PRVW QRWRULRXV µGUXJ KXEV¶ DQG UHFHQWO\ KDLOHG DV D SROLF\ PRGHO E\
international experts. Based on previously inaccessible government documents, interviews 
with key officials in Nigeria, as well as ethnographic work aW1LJHULD¶VNH\GUXJDJHQF\WKH
article provides a unique insight into the politics of drug policy-making and implementation 
in West Africa.  
 
Results: After describing the dominant official narraWLYHV RI 1LJHULD¶V GUXJ FRQWURO WKH
article shows how the key political dynamics underlying drug policy remain obscured by 
these narratives. Nigerian drug policy has been characterised by a highly exclusive policy-
making process, repression as the sole means of implementation and a strong bond with 
international drug agencies. This policy emerged in the 1980s and 1990s and has remained 
the unchallenged norm until today. The political processes underlying Nigerian drug policy 
also explain why policy reform has been and will be difficult to accomplish.  
 
Conclusion: These domestic political processes have largely been ignored in the existing 
depictions of drugs in West Africa, as they have mainly focused on externally driven drug 
threats and foreign policy responses. Most importantly, they have ignored the role played by 
the state. Rather than being too weak, the Nigerian state has shown a clear tendency towards 
repressive and coercive drug policy, which has received little popular support.  
 
 
 
Keywords: drug policy; drug trade; Nigeria; West Africa; exclusion; repression; power 
 
 
This is the author-accepted manuscript for the article Klantschnig, G. (2015). The politics of 
drug control in Nigeria: exclusion, repression and obstacles to policy change. International 
Journal of Drug Policy. 10.1016/j.drugpo.2015.10.012  
 
© 2015. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 
 2 
Introduction 
 
International agencies have viewed West Africa as a major player in the global trade in 
cocaine and heroin and in efforts to control that trade. During the last ten years there have 
been media and official reports of escalating arrests of West African drug smugglers, large-
scale seizures and concerns about narco-states in the subregion (UNODC, 2008; Observer, 
2008; El Pais, 2009; New York Times, 2010). It has been claimed that after decades of the 
VXEUHJLRQ¶V LQVLJQLILFDQW UROH LQ WKHJOREDO WUDGH DQG LWV FRQWURO D VXEVWDQWLDO VKDUHRI WKH
drugs available in Western consumer markets transit through West Africa today and are 
increasingly used there as well. The head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
stated in 2008,  
 
/HW¶V EH IUDQN $IULFD LQ JHQHUDO QHYHU IDFHG D GUXJ SUREOHP ± whether we speak about 
production, trafficking or consumption. Now the threat is there, on all these fronts (Costa, 2008). 
 
By the end of the decade, increasing concern led to depictions RI:HVW$IULFDDVWKHµFRNH
FRDVW¶ DQG VWDWHV VXFK DV *XLQHD-%LVVDX FDPH WR EH ODEHOOHG DV µQDUFR-VWDWHV¶ FROODSVLQJ
XQGHU WKHµLQYLVLEOH WLGH¶RIGUXJ WUDIILFNLQJDQGXVHICG, 2008; Cockayne and Williams, 
2009; Vernaschi, 2010). International experts were certain about the ever-growing 
PDJQLWXGHRI:HVW$IULFD¶V UROH LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDOGUXJ WUDGH The head of the UNODC 
argued µ, KDYH QR GRXEW ZH¶UH JRLQJ WR VHH SURGXFWLRQ [of cocaine]¶ &RVWD FLWHG LQ
Kirschke, 2008). 
Such dramatic claims DERXW:HVW$IULFD¶VGUXJPDUNHWV ± many of them based on 
little evidence ± have helped to attract public and donor attention WR$IULFD¶VGUXJSUREOHPV
However, they have also hindered a better understanding of drug trends and policies in the 
VXEUHJLRQ DV WKH\ GHVFULEH :HVW $IULFD¶V GUXJ SUREOHPV DV ODUJHO\ GULYHQ E\ H[WHUQDO
factors and states in the subregion as too weak, porous and unprepared to withstand this 
external threat (UNODC, 2008; ICG, 2008; Cockayne and Williams, 2009; Vernaschi, 
2010). This article assesses and challenges some of these depictions with a case study of the 
recent history of drug control in Nigeria ± RQHRI:HVW$IULFD¶VPRVWQRWRULRXVµGUXJKXEV¶
that attracted attention long before the current concerns with cocaine trafficking in the 
subregion and a country now hailed as a drug policy model by international experts. In 
contrast to media and official depictions and by building on the limited drug policy research 
available on Africa (Bernstein, 1999; Klein 1999; Obot, 2004), it aims to provide a rare 
empirically based analysis of the drug policy making and implementation process in West 
Africa. 
The article begins by reconstructing dominant narraWLYHVRI1LJHULD¶VGUXJFRQWUol, 
while the subsequent parts assess the political dynamics hidden by these narratives, drawing 
on an historically grounded and constructivist approach to analysing policy. First, rather 
than simply being driven by drug-related trends, drug control followed a broader 
institutional process of exclusion, typical under periods of military rule in West Africa and 
continuing into democratic Nigeria after 1999. Second and linked to this process, the 
Nigerian state ± UDWKHU WKDQ EHLQJ WRR µZHDN¶ WR UHDFW ± showed a strong preference for 
repressive drug control sidelining the policy alternatives propagated by health officials. 
Finally, Nigerian drug officials, particularly in the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA), have also begun to externalise their domestic political conflicts over resources 
and ideas in the last fifteen years by drawing in international drug agencies ± mostly as a 
means to prevent policy change and reform. In essence, drug control over the last 25 years 
has been driven more by concerns over state SRZHUUDWKHU WKDQ1LJHULD¶VGUXJSUREOHPV± 
HYLGHQFHRIZKLFKKDVEHHQVSDUVHVLQFHWKHFRXQWU\¶VHDUOLHVWGUXJSROLFLHV 
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Data and methods 
 
$V ZLWK PDQ\ RWKHU FULPLQDO PDUNHWV RXWVLGH 1RUWK $PHULFD DQG (XURSH :HVW $IULFD¶V
illegal drug markets and their control remain largely unexplored and not well understood. 
The main reason for this gap in our understanding is the lack of available data on the most 
basic aspects of drug markets. Government studies on drug use and trade are largely 
unavailable in West Africa. In Nigeria, research and the collection of statistics is one of the 
lowest priorities of the national drug agency and usually conducted on the sidelines of law 
enforcement activities (NDLEA assistant director 6, 2005). The last large-scale UN research 
exercise in the country goes back to the 1990s, prompting an interviewed UN official to state 
his embarrassment about formulating policy in an evidence vacuum (High-level UNODC 
official, 2010). Even the highly unreliable drug seizure and arrest figures are rarely 
systematically collected and reported in most West African countries (Carrier and 
Klantschnig, 2012, p.19). Notwithstanding this lack of most basic data, the media and 
officials have often made far-reaching statements about the nature of drug markets in the 
subregion.  
In order to overcome the lack of easily accessible data, this article is based on 
previously inaccessible official documents collected in Nigeria, most of them unpublished 
reports, a limited number of mostly unpublished statistics and court case files provided by 
Nigerian and foreign government agencies. In addition, more than 50 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with key Nigerian and foreign mid- to high-ranking drug policy-
makers and implementers between 2005 and 2013, as well as a total period of 3 months of 
ethnographic work ± observing the day-to-GD\ RSHUDWLRQV RI 1LJHULD¶V major drug control 
agency, the NDLEA ± in Lagos in 2005 and 2007.  
As an analytical framework for this PHWKRGRORJLFDOO\GLYHUVHDQGµPL[HG¶set of data 
(Cresswell, 2011), the article draws on research that has emphasised the framing of drug 
problems and their socially and historically constructed nature. Such an approach aims to 
uncover the political and institutional interests which shape drug problems and related 
policies. These interests are often not only the driving force behind drug policy but also 
influence the framing of drug problems, which are not seen as given but socially and 
historically constructed.  
While there are various strands in this constructivist literature, one major strand 
focuses on the instrumental invention of crime and drug problems and related policy. 
According to this radical labelling theory, actual social conditions, such as drug use, are 
secondary compared to the interpretations of these conditions by policy-makers (Becker, 
1966; Best, 2004). Uncovering this construction process highlights the interests of policy 
entrepreneurs who are based within or outside the state, and deconstructs their claims about 
crime and drug problems (Becker, 1966). ,Q RXU FDVH 1LJHULDQ DQG 81 RIILFLDOV¶ FODLPV
about West Africa as a new centre of the drug trade have helped to conceive a specific crime 
problem that has served their political interests (Costa, 2008).  
More recent theorisation by criminological constructivists, as well as attempts to 
view drug policy from a historical sociology or problematisation perspective (Seddon, 2011; 
Bacchi, 2009, 2012), has differed from the above strand, as they have opted for a more 
historically grounded construction instead of stressing the invention of crime (Best, 2004). 
Social problems, such as drug use and trade, are not simply invented by policy entrepreneurs 
but are constructed by various actors over time based on actual social conditions. As this 
article will show, Nigerian and UN officials GLG QRW LQYHQW :HVW $IULFD¶V GUXJ SUREOHP
however, they framed the problem in a way beneficial to them and consciously ignored 
certain aspects of the drug market, such as drug use and treatment.  
In fact, social historians have illustrated the complex construction and framing 
process of drug problems most effectively. Berridge, in her pioneering work on British 
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opium, has described the intertwined history of opium use and anti-opium policy, arguing 
that the peculiar British approach to drug control and the framing of the drug problem was a 
compromise between the interests of the medical profession and governmental departments, 
such as the Home Office (Berridge, 1999). With no similar work available on illegal drugs 
in Africa, it is social historians of alcohol, who have provided comparable analyses of the 
construction of substance-related problems and policies (Akyeampong, 1996; Willis, 2002; 
Klantschnig, Carrier and Ambler 2014). Akyeampong, for example, has described the 
evolution of alcohol policy and narratives of alcohol problems in Ghana as a negotiation 
between the commercial interests of the colonial state and temperance supporters 
(Akyeampong, 1996). Essentially, these historical analyses have demonstrated the 
construction of drug policies and related narratives on drug problems within their wider 
social and political context, without which it would be difficult to explain the emergence and 
SHUVLVWHQFHRIRIWHQµLUUDWLRQDO¶DQGLQHIIHFWLYHSROLFLes. 
In order to apply this historical and constructivist approach to an analysis of Nigerian 
drug policy, the gathered data was, first, used for a reconstruction of the dominant narratives 
of drug control in the Nigerian µGUXJSROLF\FRPPXQLW\¶ since the late 1980s, drawing on 
drug laws, official reports, NDLEA newsletters (Drugforce, Drug Salvation Force) and 
interviews. In the subsequent part, these narratives are contrasted with the available evidence 
on drug markets, in particular the limited number of official Nigerian and UN statistics and 
reports on Nigerian drug trends, court case files as well as interviews with drug smugglers. 
Finally, a thematic analysis of official reports, interviews and ethnographic fieldnotes was 
used to ascertain the key political dynamics of Nigerian drug control hidden by these 
narratives: exclusion, repression and concerns over bureaucratic power. 
 
 
Nigerian drug war narratives 
 
Nigerian drug control institutions, policies and related narratives emerged during periods of 
military rule. Nigeria saw its first military intervention into politics only 6 years after 
independence in 1966, followed by the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). The three decades 
after the war were dominated by military regimes, except for a brief spell of multi-party 
democracy from 1979 to 1983. Military-led authoritarianism peaked under the 
internationally isolated Abacha regime in the 1990s (Mustapha, 2002). Since 1999, multi-
party democracy has become the norm and the country has seen a successful consolidation 
of its democratic political system. However, there are important remnants of the military 
VWDWH*HQHUDOHOHFWLRQVKDYHLQ1LJHULDDWWLPHVEHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGDVµHOHFWLRQVRIJHQHUDOV¶
± most recently with the victory of former military leader General Buhari. More importantly, 
many of the Nigerian political institutions and decision-making processes can be traced back 
to authoritarian rule. Thus, while there have been important reforms of the state, in the 
sphere of Nigerian drug control as in other policy areas, there is a significant continuity of 
institutions, policies and drug related narratives.  
 
Official views of Nigerian drug control have also shown this continuity. Government 
officials, mid- to high-ranking drug agents, as well as foreign drug policy officials based in 
Nigeria have always included two core elements in their depictions of Nigerian drug control: 
a drug-related crisis and a targeted and successful policy response. Since the 1980s, Nigerian 
heroin and cocaine traffickers (and, to a lesser extent, local drug users) have epitomised 
local drug markets as a symbol of both 1LJHULD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLPDJH of corruption and local 
critiques of illegitimate wealth and consumption (Apter, 1999). In particular the military 
regimes of Generals Buhari (1983-85), Babangida (1985-1993) and Abacha (1993-1998) 
perceived the drug trade through Nigeria as tarnishing WKH FRXQWU\¶V DQG HVSHFLDOO\ WKH
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PLOLWDU\HOLWH¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHSXWDWLRQ1LJHULD¶VPDMRUGUXJODZVHWWLQJXSWKHNDLEA in 
1989 highlighted image improvement as a key concern (Nigeria FMG, 1989). This rationale 
IRU WKHDJHQF\¶VZRUNEHFDPHHYHQPRUHLPSRUWDQW LQ WKHFRQWH[WRIJURZLQJ86DQG81
diplomatic pressures on the internationally isolated Abacha regime in the 1990s (Adebajo, 
2008). Since the end of military rule in 1999, the image crisis has remained central to drug 
SROLF\ PDNHUV¶ ZRUN QRW RQO\ IHDWXULQJ LQ WKH 1'/($¶V PLVVLRQ VWDWHPHQW EXW DOVR DV D
day-to-day self-justification. In a 2005 interview, a senior Nigerian drug official explained: 
 
I had cause to share a discussion with some of our officers recently and I told them that the agency 
EH\RQGEHLQJDFRXQWHUQDUFRWLFHVWDEOLVKPHQWLVDFDOOLWDQµLPDJHEXLOGHU¶IRUWKHFRXQWU\7KH
way we do our job, you know, it goes to polish or tarnish the image of the country (NDLEA 
assistant director 5, 2005). 
 
Thus, to an important degree, drug officials and officers perceive their work as responses to 
the image crises symbolised by drugs.  
The exact response to the crisis has been a military-style campaign aimed at 
µGLVFLSOLQLQJ¶ 1LJHULDQ VRFLHW\ 6LQFH WKH 1980s disciplinary campaigns have been an 
LQWHJUDOSDUWRIJRYHUQPHQWGLVFRXUVHIRULQVWDQFHWKURXJKWKHGHFODUDWLRQRIDµ:DU$JDLQVW
,QGLVFLSOLQH¶ under the Buhari regime, which tried WRµVHWXSEDVLFQRUPVDQGVWDQGDUGVIRU
an orGHUO\ VRFLHW\¶ WKURXJK PHDVXUHV such as national sanitation days. The military 
government at the time introduced semi-military tribunals that should speed up the 
prosecution of offenders and instituted harsh penalties, including death for tampering with 
telephone wires, unlawful dealing in petrol products and some drug-related offences (Graf, 
1988; Othman, 1989). In the field of drug control this approach also led to the founding of 
specialised drug squads ± WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW RQH EHLQJ WKH 1'/($ 7KH GUXJ DJHQF\¶V
HIIRUWVDUHVXSSRVHGWRSURWHFWD1LJHULDQVRFLHW\LQFULVLVDVZHOODVUHVWRULQJWKHQDWLRQ¶V
image. 
According to most Nigerian drug officials, NDLEA campaigns started to be 
successful in the second half of the 1990s, when the military government made the drug war 
a top political priority. This drug war was able to stop the ever-increasing tide of cocaine 
and heroin shipped through Nigeria. In order to support this claim of success, officials 
highlight increasing drug seizures as measures of performance ± seizure statistics are 
UHIHUUHG WR DV µSHUIRUPDQFH VFRUHFDUGV¶ in the NDLEA ± and the tonnes of drugs that are 
burnt at officially choreographed events every few months (NDLEA, 2005). They also point 
to a range of approval messages from the national media and foreign drug agencies since the 
second half of the 1990s. This positive reporting on the Nigerian drug agency has continued 
and intensified since the end of military rule in 1999. The national media has published 
repeated stories praising the efforts of the NDLEA ± ZLWKWLWOHVVXFKDVµ:H$UH:LQQLQJ
WKH 'UXJ :DU¶ µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPXQLW\ :RRV 1'/($¶ RU µ81 $SSODXGV $QWL-Drug 
&UXVDGHU¶ Daily Sketch, 2001; Daily Sun, 2004; Vanguard, 2004). News stories more 
critical of the NDLEA have been exceptional (NDLEA, 2004). 
From the late 1990s onwards, foreign agencies, such as the US Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and the UNODC also started to praise the efforts of the NDLEA in 
their annuaO UHSRUWV DQG GHVFULEHG WKH DJHQF\ DV 1LJHULD¶V µPRVW SURIHVVLRQDO ERG\¶
combating drug trafficking. This praise came after several years of international critique for 
an agency that had been rife with corruption. From the late 1990s onwards, foreign agencies 
claimed that the NDLEA had µDVVXPHG D OHDGHUVKLS UROH LQ GUXJ ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW LQ WKH
UHJLRQ¶ 86 6WDWH 'HSDUWPHQW     Daily Sun, 2004). In more recent 
years, even the US State Department, which had been the driving force behind NigeULD¶V
drug policy-UHODWHGµGHFHUWLILFDWLRQ¶WKURXJKRXWPRVWRIV (Obot, 2004), joined the ranks 
of admirers:  
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Despite the significant challenges facing West Africa, there is reason for hope. Oil-wealthy Nigeria is 
entirely unique: numerous and very experienced Nigerian traffickers have been deployed worldwide 
over decades. But despite its many problems the Government of Nigeria has demonstrated increased 
SROLWLFDO ZLOO LQ ILJKWLQJ QDUFRWLFV « 1LJHULD¶V 1DWLRQDO 'UXJ DQG /DZ (QIRUFHPHQW $JHQF\
(NDLEA) flexed its muscles in arresting a drug kingpin, processing an extradition, and convicting 
1,231 of 1,239 traffickers (Carson, 2009). 
 
This shows that the narrative of crisis and policy success has been dominant not only among 
the majority of Nigerian drug officials ± both senior and junior ± since the late 1990s, but 
the national media and foreign drug policy officials have also used this narrative in dealing 
with Nigeria. UN and US drug officials have even encouraged the NDLEA to train other 
African enforcHUV DW WKH DJHQF\¶V UHJLRQDO GUXJ FRQWURO DFDGHP\ DQG DVVLVWHG the agency 
with the coordination of West Africa-wide enforcement operations (NDLEA chairman, 
2005; NDLEA director 7, 2005). Today, the NDLEA serves as a success story in Nigeria 
especially when compared to the many other agencies that are still struggling with the levels 
of corruption and disorganisation that the NDLEA faced in the 1990s (Hills, 2008). Nigerian 
drug policy also serves as a model for much of West Africa in the eyes of Nigerian and 
international policy-makers, even in countries such as Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, 
which have faced some of the greatest drug-related challenges recently.  
 
 
The politics of drug markets  
 
However, there are serious problems with this narrative of a linear development from drug 
crisis to policy success ± some of which are acknowledged by Nigerian drug officials 
themselves (NDLEA director 3, 2005). While the agency is arguably one of the most 
organised and disciplined law enforcement bodies in the country today, its claims to have 
VXFFHVVIXOO\ WDFNOHG 1LJHULD¶V GUXJ SUREOHPV DUH KLJKO\ GXELRXV 7KHVH FODLPV assume a 
development of drug markets that is not supported by the available empirical evidence.  
As shown by historical research on the drug trade in West Africa and confirmed by 
my interviews, cocaine and heroin smuggling through Nigeria and local cannabis cultivation 
and use, as well as social anxieties about them, already existed long before the declarations 
of drug war in the 1980s and 1990s (Akyeampong, 2005; Ellis, 2009; Former heroin and 
cocaine smuggler, 2005). The mid-1960s and 1980s, in particular, saw significant popular 
debate about the harms that cannabis, heroin and cocaine could cause to Nigerian society 
and especially young people. Nigerian newspapers and expert conferences at the time 
provide evidence of wide-spread concerns and a lively debate about growing drug use and 
cultivation in Nigeria (Klantschnig, 2014).  
 
Nonetheless, few of these drugs attracted much attention in policy circles until 
PLOLWDU\ UXOHUV GHFODUHG WKHP DV V\PEROV RI 1LJHULD¶V FULVLV )RU LQVWDQFH WKH ZHOO-
established and prospering cannabis market was only µdiscovered¶ by Nigerian drug officials 
in the second half of the 1990s. Then, they argued that:  
 
an epic proportional rise in cannabis trafficking is expected before the heavy hand of the law catches 
up totally with its traffickers in Nigeria, as happened to cocaine and heroin peddlers of the 1980s 
(Drug Salvation Force, 1997b). 
 
In fact, cannabis only became a policy problem when policy-makers saw an opportunity to 
focus on it. This is well-illustrated through Nigerian cannabis seizures in Figure 1. Seizures, 
which had been steadily rising since the mid-1960s, abruptly declined in the late 1980s, not 
because the drug vanished from the market but because cocaine and heroin instead became 
major policy concerns. Cannabis seizures only increased again, when the NDLEA had 
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enough resources available to focus on heroin and cocaine, as well as cannabis (NDLEA, 
2005).1 In essence, cannabis and other drugs were manipulated as policy problems when 
WKH\ILWLQWRWKHRIILFLDOQDUUDWLYHRI1LJHULD¶VFULVLVDQGwhen there were enough resources 
to intercept these drugs. This is, of course, not to say that policy makers invented 1LJHULD¶V
drug problems and social concerns about drugs, such as cannabis. They opportunistically 
focussed on drugs as policy issues and knew how to stoke the existing social insecurities 
about drugs and wider social problems in Nigeria. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Reported cannabis herb seizures in Nigeria (kilogram), 1972-1999 
 
 
Source: UN CND, 1975-1991; NDLEA, 2005 
 
 
 
It also cannot be denied that some drug trends and especially seizures of drugs have 
been important in the shaping of drug policy. Nigerian drug policy and also its related 
narratives were not completely delinked from the drug market. In the second half of the 
1980s, arrests of cocaine and heroin smugglers sharply increased in Nigeria and this 
intensified drug policy making at the time. However, also the internationalisation of the US 
war on drugs in the mid-1980s directly impacted on Nigerian policy at the time. For instance 
a new US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office was opened in Lagos in 1986 and 
the first drug control aid was provided to the Nigerian government (Nadelmann 1993; US 
DEA agent, 2005).  
Similarly, over the last ten years, there have been some changes to the volumes and 
means of transport of cocaine transited through West Africa, which have helped to galvanise 
policy interest. The recent changes are well-illustrated by the widely publicised interdictions 
of tonnes of cocaine off the coast of Guinea-Bissau or Gambia (Reuters, 2008; BBC News 
2010; This Day, 2006). Nigeria has had its share of such large-scale seizures, such as 14.2 
tonnes of cocaine seized in Lagos in 2006. However, many of the facts of this Nigerian 
                                                        
1
 As in most other parts of Africa, there is evidence that cannabis use and cultivation has steadily 
increased since the 1980s, mainly due to growing demand and because cannabis has been a chief 
means of agricultural diversification (Bernstein, 1999; Laniel, 2006). 
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
5,000 
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seizure ± a mixture of cocaine and cement found in a container ± in particular the exact 
amount of drugs seized remain contested (NDLEA director 4, 2012). 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the transit trade in cocaine and heroin through 
Lagos has been fairly stable since the 1980s, based on the limited data available. Since 2006 
there has been no comparable large-scale seizure in Nigeria and in fact, cocaine and heroin 
seizures have remained within the range of 100-400 kilograms annually. Aside from some 
temporary and sharp increases due to a few exceptionally large seizures, a long-term view of 
Nigerian cocaine and heroin figures shows that markets for the drugs seem to have been 
relatively stable (UN CND, 1975-1991; NDLEA, 2008, 2011; Daily Independent, 2014). 
Based on the above, it is apparent that the narratives of Nigerian drug control and its 
supposed success says more about the interests of control officials rather than about drug 
market trends and the genuine social anxieties about drugs in Nigeria. It is also telling in our 
FDVHWKDWQRPDMRUUHVHDUFKH[HUFLVHKDVEHHQFRQGXFWHGRQ1LJHULD¶VGUXJPDUNHWVVLQFHWKH
late 1990s (High-level UNODC official, 2010). In such a context, drug officials could quite 
DUELWUDULO\ FODLP WKDW WKHLU DFWLRQV KDYH EHHQ µHIIHFWLYH¶ DW HOLPLQDWLQJ D VSHFLILF GUXJ
problem and therefore justifying their institutional existence. There is simply no evidence 
for a policy success story and no research available to show that drug policy has been 
effective at displacing cocaine, heroin or cannabis from the Nigerian market, as claimed in 
official narratives. The limited drug price data indicates that prices for cocaine, heroin and 
cannabis have steadily decreased in Nigeria over the last two decades, showing little impact 
of the supply-focussed anti-drug measures (UNODC, 1999; Klantschnig, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the dominant narratives of Nigerian drug control have had their µHIIHFWV¶ LQ
Nigeria ± even if not on the drug market ± as there is now no significant counter-narrative 
left in official and public debates about drugs and drug policy (Comaroff and Comaroff, 
2006). 
 
 
Exclusion  
 
This lack of counter-narratives about drugs in Nigeria and the inexistence of a debate on 
drugs has also been a by-product of the evolution of drug policy. A process of exclusion has 
been a major structural characteristic of Nigerian drug policy. As political scientists have 
shown, exclusion has been, in fact, one of the hallmarks of the West African state, not only 
in the drug policy field. In Nigeria, this trend had started in the 1960s and was at its peak 
during the internationally and internally isolated Abacha regime that concentrated powers in 
a clique of political supporters DQG µH[SHUWV¶, many of them military officers (Mustapha, 
2002; Othman, 1989). With this system surviving until today, this means that very few 
Nigerians are still involved in the design as well as in the debate about drug policy.  
Since its foundation, the NDLEA started to monopolise drug control and policy 
decision-making, as it became the single agency dealing with drug investigations, 
prosecution and demand reduction. Before 1989, various actors, such as the Ministry of 
Health, Customs and the Police shared responsibility over the control of drugs in Nigeria but 
since then the NDLEA has been the undisputed centre of national policy. The NDLEA has 
not only become the main implementer of drug policy but also started to supervise all other 
agencies in the field. With such extensive powers, the NDLEA remains exceptional among 
drug control agencies globally. The US DEA, for instance, handles neither drug prosecution 
nor demand reduction. The Ghanaian Narcotics Control Board is chiefly a policy-making 
body that leaves the implementation of policy to the Ghanaian Police and the Ministry of 
Health (Bernstein, 1999). 
In the 1990s, this exclusionary trend went furthest, when a military general was 
appointed as NDLEA chairman and he in turn concentrated decision-making powers inside 
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the drug agency. Interviewees recounted how every minor internal decision required the 
VLJQDWXUH IURP WKHDJHQF\¶VFKDLUPDQ LQ WKHVHFRQGKDOIRI WKHV 1'/($FKDLUPDQ
 ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH DJHQF\¶s supervisory board, which had acted as a forum for non-
NDLEA officials to influence and check NDLEA powers, was abolished. The lack of a 
board meant that drug policy-making as well as implementation powers were concentrated 
in the hands of the NDLEA and its chairman, and the agency acted independently in the 
national political framework (NDLEA assistant director 1, 2005). Most importantly, this 
framework established under military rule has largely survived under the democratically 
elected governments since 1999, as 1LJHULD¶VGHPRFUDWLF LQVWLWXWLRQVVXFKDV WKH1DWLRQDO
Assembly and its specialised drugs committees, have been unable to challenge or change the 
legal drug control framework (Nigerian senator, 2005).  
Beyond the institutional level, this trend of exclusion has also meant a sidelining of 
DOWHUQDWLYHYLHZVRQ1LJHULD¶VGUXJSUREOHP0HGLFDOSURIHVVLRQDOV DFDGHPLFVDQG1*2V
have been gradually excluded from the drug policy-making and implementation process. 
Doctors, who had been important in the fRUPXODWLRQRI1LJHULD¶VHDUOLHVWGUXJSROLFLHVLQWKH
1960s, continued to challenge dominant drug control until the late 1980s (Klantschnig 
2014). In the 1990s many of them moved into the NGO sector to offer alternative drug 
treatment options. However, due to decreased donor funding for NGOs in the late 1990s, 
there has been little championing of these alternative views on drug control (Adamson, 
1990; Emafo, 1990; Famuyiwa, 1990). The biennial conference of the Nigeria-based Centre 
for Research and Information on Substance Abuse (CRISA) is one of the few instances 
where these alternative views are still openly expressed but even here the NDLEA has a 
significant voice. Since the 1990s, the NDLEA has essentially become the major legitimate 
voice to comment on Nigerian drug policy in the public sphere and in the media. The few 
alternative views left today, for instance doctors concerned with the treatment of drug users 
LQSV\FKLDWULFKRVSLWDOVKDYHDOOEXWJLYHQXSRQWKHVWDWH¶VGUXJSROLF\,QDQLQWHUYLHZLQ 
2005, one doctor argued:  
 
7KHUH LVQRGUXJSROLF\H[FHSW IRU WKH LQWHUFHSWLRQRIGUXJVDQG WKLV LVD IDLOLQJJDPH7KH\GRQ¶W
even know the drug problem ± their [NDLEA] officers deny the Nigerian drug problem  (Coordinator 
of drug use treatment NGO, 2005).  
 
 
 
Repression 
 
7KH GUXJ FRQWURO DSSURDFK SULRULWLVHG E\ WKLV FRUH JURXS RI µH[SHUWV¶ LQ WKH 1'/($ KDV
been repression. Repression in Nigeria, as in many other countries, has meant a reactive and 
coercive supply control approach to drug policy. This approach is clearly prioritised by the 
majority of drug officials and has come at the cost of alternative medical and socio-
economic approaches to drug control ZKLFK VKRXOG DOVR EH SDUW RI WKH 1'/($¶V GUXJ
control mandate, according to the law.  
 
This repressive approach was clearly seen as the major role of the NDLEA, despite the much 
broader legal mandate of the agency and also some recent international initiatives to 
emphasise the health dimension of drug control in the subregion (WACD, 2014). One 
interviewed NDLEA official illustrated the mentality of the agency and most of its officers 
well by stating that:  
 
LQYHVWLJDWRUVVHHWKHPVHOYHVDVWKHUHDOSHRSOHRIWKH1'/($«OLNHLQWKHDUP\WKH\DUHVHHQDV
real field soldiers, real people getting out there and catching the drug barons (NDLEA assistant 
director 2, 2005).  
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Thus GHVSLWH WKH DJHQF\¶V broad mandate to handle all aspects of drug control, including 
drug demand reduction and treatment, the agency clearly prioritised drug supply initiatives, 
especially at ports and in urban areas.  
$GHSLFWLRQRIGUXJDJHQWV¶ZRUNDVµJHWWLQJRXWWKHUHDQGFDWFKLQJWKHEDURQV¶LVRI
course not realistic and slightly misleading. Based on my observations, the day-to-day work 
of Nigerian drug officers involves mundane tasks common to law enforcers elsewhere, such 
as filling in forms, waiting for superiors or the return of electricity (Foster and Bowling, 
2002). Moonlighting or the conduct of tasks not necessarily associated with the work of a 
drug agent, such as the sale of agricultural produce or mobile phone cards, is also common 
DPRQJ WKH 1'/($¶V  officers (NDLEA, 2011). It is harder to estimate how 
widespread corrupt practices, such as extortion and bribery are, as our evidence is largely 
based on personal anecdotes and the few instances reported in the press. Several NDLEA 
interviewees argued that extortion at roadblocks and bribery will always be a feature of the 
work of drug officers, as long as their salaries remain a fraction of the bribes that drug 
smugglers have to offer (NDLEA director 3 and director 7, 2005). Nonetheless, evidence for 
high-level political involvement in the drug trade, as assumed in portrayals of West African 
µQDUFR-VWDWHV¶LVQRWDYDLODEOHLQ1LJHULDZKHUHVWDWHRIILFLDOVGHULYHPXFK larger sums from 
the diversion of petroleum funds (Carrier and Klantschnig, 2012).  
Coercion, in contrast, is a more common and a slightly better documented feature of 
WKH1'/($¶VGDLO\ZRUN9LROHQWHUDGLFDWLRQFDPSDLJQVWRGHVWUR\FDQQDELVIDUPODQG± at 
times killing farmers ± brutal arrests and illegal detentions as well the harassment of 
travellers at airports is the day-to-day face of drug control to many Nigerians. The peaks of 
these coercive activities occurred during the Buhari regime in the 1980s, when drug 
smugglers were publicly executed, as well as under Abacha in the 1990s when drug agents 
ZHUHZHOONQRZQIRULOOHJDOO\H[WRUWLQJPRQH\IURP1LJHULDQVWKURXJKDSROLF\RIµDUUHVWWR
ORRW¶$FRQWHPSRUDU\REVHUYHUUHFRXQWHGWKHVWRU\RIDQH[-soldier who was imprisoned for 
cannabis possession: 
 
The NDLEA came to my house one night. They had been informed by my neighbour that I was 
smoking hemp. I have been smoking for 22 years and have never been in any trouble. They break into 
my house and carried off all my property, the TV, videos, my papers, my pension (Klein, 1999, p.60). 
 
$OWKRXJKSUDFWLFHVVXFKDVµDUUHVWWRORRW¶DUHOHVVSUHYDOHQWWRGD\ and the agency has gone 
through a series of internal re-organisations, the campaigns of the 1990s still remain the 
PRVWFHOHEUDWHGH[DPSOHVRIµHIIHFWLYHGUXJZDU¶DPRQJRIILFLDOV1'/($GLUHFWRUDQG
2005). Many other coercive practices introduced under the Abacha regime have become 
institutionalised through drug laws that give NDLEA officers excessive powers to arrest, 
seize assets of suspects and publicly parade them before they appear in court. There is also 
evidence that drug-related suspects are ill-treated and at times tortured in detention cells and 
in over-FURZGHGSULVRQVZKLOHWKH\DUHµDZDLWLQJWULDO¶IRUPRQWKVDQGVRPHWLPHVIRU\HDUV
(HRW, 2005, p.45).  
Importantly, these repressive activities have come at the cost of alternative medical 
and socio-economic approaches to drug control. Although demand reduction and drug user 
treatment are formal functions of the NDLEA, they only exist in a minimalist way and are 
clearly underfunded. The agency provides counselling for users but refers serious cases to 
state or private-run drug treatment and rehabilitation centres ± the majority of which are only 
affordable for the richest in the country. The only in-house facility that the NDLEA provides 
for treatment is a prison cell for detoxification (NDLEA assistant director 3, 2005). The 
DJHQF\¶V GUXJ GHPDQG ZRUN LV FOHDUO\ QRW VHHQ DV D SULRULW\ LQ SROLF\ FLUFles and in the 
DJHQF\ LWVHOI 5HSUHVVLYH LQWHUGLFWLRQ LV WKH µUHDO ZRUN¶ DQG WKH GRPLQDQW PHQWDOLW\ RI
NDLEA drug officials and officers on the ground. This work has been extended over the last 
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few years as the number of drug agents has increased, whereas drug demand reduction or 
research remains on the sidelines.  
 
 
Obstacles to policy change  
 
In spite of these continuities of drug control, there has been one significant change since the 
end of military rule in 1999: declining domestic political support for the drug war. In 
contrast to the late 1990s when drug policy was a top priority of the Abacha regime, political 
support and funds decreased with the handover to civilian rulers in 1999. In the last ten 
years, almost every drug official interviewed stressed the lack of funding from the Nigerian 
government as the major challenge to the work of his or her department, and to the drug 
agency in general (NDLEA director 6 and 7, 2005). 
Several high-ranking officials blamed the financial problems directly on the lack of 
political will shown by the democratically elected government. Increased bureaucratic 
hurdles to acquire funds, as well as the increased number of actors involved in dispensing 
money were seen as reasons for the decline in funds (NDLEA assistant director 1 and 3, 
2005). Most often, the president was seen as not properly committed to the drug war, 
compared with the military regime of the 1990s (NDLEA director 2 and 3, 2005). 
Consequently, the NDLEA has perceived the lack of political will as the greatest threat to its 
work since 1999.2  
While this decline in political support emanated from the president and new 
democratic institutions, the Nigerian drug agency has been able to find alternative allies in 
international drug control agencies. In fact, the NDLEA never perceived US and UN drug 
agencies as a threat. They were rather seen as a resource for additional funds and recognition 
throughout NDLEA history. Even during the 1990s when the Nigerian government was 
internationally isolated, the NDLEA was still cooperating closely with its international 
partner agencies (Drug Salvation Force, 1997a). Since 1999, international cooperation has 
been judged excellent in most parts of the Nigerian drug community (NDLEA mid-ranking 
officer 1, 2005; NDLEA director 6 and 7, 2005). In their newsletter, in the national media 
and in interviews, Nigerian drug officials and their foreign counterparts praised each other 
DQG ODXGHG WKH µSDUWQHUVKLS¶ EHWZHHQ WKH 1LJHULDQ 81 DQG 86 GUXJ DJHQFLHV 'UXJ
Salvation Force, 2003a and 2004). 1LJHULD¶V µGUXJ FRQWURO PRGHO VWDWXV¶ VKRXOG DOVR EH
understood within this context of close cooperation from the late 1990s onwards. The 
clearest material manifestation of the partnership was a rise in foreign drug control aid, 
which reached its highest levels in the 2000s (UNODC, 2005; US State Department, 2003).  
This close inter-agency relationship also meant that, aside from the so-called µGUXJ
PHQDFH¶ 1LJHULDQ 81 DQG 86 GUXJ RIILFLDOV now faced another common enemy: the 
Nigerian governmeQW¶VGLVLQWHUHVWLQGUXJFRQWURO. The close NDLEA relations with foreign 
counterparts were even used to put pressure on the Nigerian government. Interviewed 
NDLEA officials recounted how US drug control representatives in Nigeria helped the 
NDLEA to a higher capital budget by pressurising the president (NDLEA director 3, 2005). 
Thus, international agencies had become major allies against the government, as the alliance 
with the UN and US drug agencies provided international recognition, which, in turn, helped 
to resist policy change and guaranteed institutional survival for the NDLEA. Intensified 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRRSHUDWLRQ KHOSHG WR UHWDLQ WKH 1'/($¶V IDYRXUDEOH SRVLWLRQ LQ GRPHVWLF
struggles over power and influence.  
 
                                                        
2
 Note that this relative political disinterest in drug control might change due to the return of the 1980s 
military ruler General Buhari as elected president in May 2015. 
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Nonetheless, international pressures have not always been in favour of the law 
enforcement-oriented status quo in Nigeria and West Africa. The West Africa Commission 
on Drugs, established in 2013 by Kofi Annan and other West African former statesmen, has 
been part of a global re-think of law enforcement dominated drug policy of late. One of its 
major aims has been to shift the focus of drug policy in West Africa towards the needs of 
drug users and to see drugs and particularly drug use as a health rather than a criminal 
justice problem (WACD, 2014). While this initiative is in part driven by a former Nigerian 
president and has been supported by some Nigerian health professionals, it is uncertain how 
much impact these reform proposals will have in Nigeria, where political debate on drugs 
has been largely silenced since the late 1980s and a dominant narrative has been pervasive.  
Arguably, there have been some significant shifts in policy focus elsewhere on the 
continent in recent years, especially the inclusion of harm reduction measures (see Ratcliff 
and McCurdy, this issue) and one might expect something similar to happen in Nigeria with 
its long history of drug control. However, with its current institutional structure opposing 
changes to supply-focussed drug policy and the NDLEA perceiving any change in policy as 
an affront at its policy monopoly, change is hard to foresee in Nigeria. Policy change would 
only be possible if there was a fundamental shake-up of the Nigerian drug control 
IUDPHZRUNRUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDQHZDJHQF\WRFRXQWHUDµQHZSUREOHP¶DVZDVWRVRPH
H[WHQWWKHFDVHLQ7DQ]DQLDZKHUHWKHµQHZSUREOHP¶RILQMHFWLQJKHURLQXVHDQGKLJKOHYHOV
RI+,9WUDQVPLVVLRQDPRQJLQMHFWRUVUHTXLUHGDµQHZSROLF\¶7KHUHZRXOGDOVRKDYHWREH
some significant incentives for the NDLEA to acFHSWRUGULYHWKLVFKDQJHWRWKHFRXQWU\¶V
drug policy. All of these options, however, remain highly unlikely in the current drug 
control situation in Nigeria. Thus, although a window of opportunity for policy reform has 
recently opened internationally, the international and domestic push has not been big enough 
to overcome the existing obstacles to policy change. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The account of Nigerian drug policy has highlighted the key dynamics that determined how 
drug control emerged, was conducted and resisted change. Historical processes of exclusion, 
repression and a growing bond with international counterparts, which helped to retain 
bureaucratic power and oppose policy change, were the key dynamics underlying Nigerian 
drug control. These dynamics lay hidden behind the dominant narratives of drug war, which 
stressed a linear evolution from a drug crisis to policy success.  
In contrast to recent depictions of drugs and drug control in West Africa, the 
Nigerian case study has shown that domestic concerns about drugs and related policies pre-
dated the international concerns with cocaine transhipment during the last ten years, 
meaning that drug problems and policies in the subregion are not as new as imagined. 
Second and related to this point, the Nigerian case at least complements views that 
emphasise the external dimension of drug problems and policies on the continent (Keim, 
)RUHLJQLQIOXHQFHVRQ1LJHULDQDQGRWKHU:HVW$IULFDQFRXQWULHV¶GUXJSROLFLHVKDYH
been significant (Obot, 2004, pp. 19-23); however, there were important domestic dynamics 
WKDW VKDSHG1LJHULD¶VSROLF\ DQG WKH\RIWHQ FRQYHUJHGZLWK IRUHLJQ LQWHUHVWV DQG LGHDVRQ
drug control. 
Despite its local specificities, the Nigerian story highlights some wider implications 
for drug policy across the subregion. As a model and coordinator of drug control efforts in 
West Africa, the NDLEA has already EHHQDGULYLQJIRUFHRIGUXJFRQWUROEH\RQG1LJHULD¶V
borders. The perceived success of Nigerian drug control in the eyes of Nigerian and foreign 
drug officials has had a direct effect on drug policy in the West African subregion, 
HVSHFLDOO\DVDEOXHSULQW IRURWKHUFRXQWULHVVXFKDV6LHUUD/HRQH¶V UHFHQWO\IRXQGHGGUXJ
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DJHQF\DQRWKHU µ1'/($¶(US State Department, 2011). The Nigerian agency also started 
to coordinate West Africa-wide training and drug control operations, many of them funded 
by the US and UN drug agencies. This means the exclusive, repressive and largely 
ineffective approach to solving social problems has started to replicate itself in the 
subregion.  
Finally, a major lesson to be drawn from Nigerian drug control should be the 
repressive role played by the state ± a role largely ignored in the recent rhetoric of 
international experts. While these experts have focussed on the weak and porous nature of 
West African states as the major problem, the case of Nigerian drug control shows that ± 
rather than being too weak ± the state has been overly coercive in its conception and 
implementation of drug control. These repressive policies have lacked local support and 
legitimacy, as they are often rightfully perceived as coercive and corrupt. Even the 
812'&¶VDrug Nexus in Africa (1999) report succinctly noted in this respect: 
 
Local communities [in Africa] are unlikely to cooperate in drug control efforts when only negative 
SHQDOWLHV DUH SHUFHLYHG WR EH WKH FRQVHTXHQFH RI FRRSHUDWLRQ « $W SUHVHQW WKH QHJDWLYH UHVXOWV ± 
reduction in rural income, imprisonment of community members ± are widely recognized by the 
communities whose involvement in drug control is nothing less than essential, but the positive results 
are not (p.106). 
 
The Nigerian case shows that states in West Africa are obviously a problem not only 
because they are not effective at reducing the drug trade and drug use or because some of 
them, such as Guinea-Bissau, are actively involved in the trade, but because states and their 
policies are not credible in the eyes of their people. Thus, it is not surprising that these 
policies have faced difficulties of implementation and remain largely ineffective.  
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